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12.7.2000 SecurityCisco and Checkpoint facing firewall vulnerabilities
Two vulnerabilities are found on two firewalls leader products, one on the Cisco Pix product and the other one on Firewall-1, the leading product from Checkpoint.

En français: Cisco et Checkpoint font face à des nouvelles vulnérabilités dans leurs "firewalls"
Deux vulnérabilités ont été trouvées sur deux produits "leader" du marché des firewalls, l'un sur le PIX de Cisco et l'autre sur le produit Firewall-1 de Checkpoint.

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English version

In the case of Firewall-1 it is an early stage to define all possible usage of that vulnerability. No information is available from the vendor. But using the vulnerability found by Hugo Vázquez Caramés from Grupo ADD, it seems to be possible to have the firewall beiing not responding anymore to certain remote services among wich the famous SecuRemote used by mobile users for remote connections through Internet.

For Cisco with this vulnerability a session going through the firewall can be interrupted by any third party from the wild side. No workaround is known for the moment.

Watch for details in the following posted information

 

Résumé en français
Dans le cas de firewall-1 il est encore tôt pour déterminer l'étendue de cette vulnérabilité. Pour le moment il n'y a pas d'information du vendeur. Mais en utilisant la découverte de Hugo Vázquez Caramés du groupe ADD, il semble être possible de rendre indisponible un ensemble de services distants parmis lesquels le fameix SecuRemote qui permet aux utilisaterus mobiles de se   connecter avec leurs entreprises.

Pour Cisco une connexion passant par le firewall peut être interrompue  par n'importe qui se trouvant du côté d'Internet, à condition de dispose rd'un ombre minimal d'information.

Dans aucun des deux cas ces failles permettent d'entrer dans les sites défendus par ces firewalls, mais permet de réduire et d'interrompre leurs services.





Original information posted by Hugo Vázquez Caramés
Firewall - 1 and VPN/1 vulnerable to a partial denial of service Attack


If you flood port 264 ( FW1_topo ) from your local network, the Firewall-1
CPU reaches 100% and nobody can connect with GUI ( neither on the firewall
itself ).

The test has been done on a local 10 MB Ethernet against a PII 266 256 MB,
FW1 4.1 SP1 in a NT 4.0 SP4 with the ippacket software and spoofing the
source IP
, and that´s the packet sent :

destination IP : Firewall (external interface)
source IP : non existent IP ( on local net )
source port : 1000
destination port : 264
data : qwertyuiop1010101010
number of packets : -1 ( continuos mode )

Due to the importance of this port ( 264 ) in Securemote, etc... I think
It would be interesting to investigate how much this attack could danger
the system ( memory ) and comunications (smtp, VPN , Securemote...).

I have not tested from the Internet.

Sincerely,


--
Hugo Vázquez Caramés
Departamento Técnico de Sistemas
Seguridad Corporativa - Grupo ADD






Original Cisco security bulletin

Cisco Secure PIX Firewall TCP Reset Vulnerability
Revision 1.0

For Public Release 2000 July 11 06:00 US/Eastern (UTC+0400)

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary
=======

The Cisco Secure PIX Firewall cannot distinguish between a forged TCP Reset (RST) packet and a genuine TCP RST packet. Any TCP/IP connection established through the Cisco Secure PIX Firewall can be terminated by a third party from the untrusted network if the connection can be uniquely determined. This vulnerability is independent of configuration. There is no workaround.

This vulnerability exists in all Cisco Secure PIX Firewall software releases up to and including 4.2(5), 4.4(4), 5.0(3) and 5.1(1). The defect has been assigned Cisco bug ID CSCdr11711.

This notice is posted on Cisco's Worldwide Web site at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/pixtcpreset-pub.shtml.


Affected Products
=================

Cisco Secure PIX Firewalls with software versions up to and including 4.2(5), 4.4(4), 5.0(3) and 5.1(1) are affected.

No other products are vulnerable to this defect.


Details
=======

When the Cisco Secure PIX Firewall receives a TCP Reset (RST) packet, it evaluates that packet based on data contained in the TCP packet header: source IP address, source port, destination IP address, and destination port. If these four values match an entry in the stateful inspection table, the associated connection will be reset. This affects only TCP sessions. Data exchange based on any other protocol is not affected.

To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker would need to have or infer:

* Detailed knowledge of the connection table in the Cisco Secure PIX Firewall prior to launching the attack

Or

* Detailed knowledge of the source and destination IP Address and ports associated with a particular connection to be attacked

This particular vulnerability only affects the connection table (which keeps state regarding the connections being made through the device). It does not affect the translation table (in which address mappings are stored).

Cisco Secure PIX Firewall software has been fixed so that it now checks for a valid sequence number before removing a connection from the connection state table.


Impact
======

Any Cisco Secure PIX Firewall that provides external access to the Internet and for which all of the preceding conditions are met is vulnerable to the disruption of individual sessions.


Software Versions and Fixes
===========================

For the version listed in the left-most column below, customers should upgrade to at least the version shown in the center column. Please note the hardware requirements following the table.

+-----------------------------+--------------------------+---------------+
| |Projected first fixed | |
|Affected Version |regular release (fix will |Date Available |
| |carry forward into all | |
| |later versions) | |
+-----------------------------+--------------------------+---------------+
|All versions of Cisco Secure | | |
|PIX up to version 4.2(5) | | |
|(including 2.7, 3.0, 3.1, | 4.4(5) | 2000-06-09 |
|4.0, 4.1) | | |
+-----------------------------+--------------------------+---------------+
|All 4.3.x and 4.4.x versions | | |
|up to and including version | 4.4(5) | 2000-06-09 |
|4.4(4) | | |
+-----------------------------+--------------------------+---------------+
|Version 5.0.x up to and | | |
|including version 5.0(3) | 5.1(2) | 2000-06-09 |
+-----------------------------+--------------------------+---------------+
|Version 5.1.1 | 5.1(2) | 2000-06-09 |
+-----------------------------+--------------------------+---------------+

A 128MB upgrade for the PIX Firewall is necessary if:

* Version 4.3 or 4.4 is used on a PIX 'Classic'
(excluding PIX10000, PIX-510, PIX-520, and PIX-515)

Or

* Version 5.0 is used on a PIX 'Classic', PIX10000, or PIX-510
(excluding PIX-520 and PIX-515)

As with any new software installation, customers planning to upgrade should carefully read the release notes and other relevant documentation before beginning any upgrade. Also, it is important to be certain that the new version of Cisco Secure PIX Firewall software is supported by your hardware and especially that enough memory is available.


Obtaining Fixed Software
========================

Cisco is offering free software upgrades to remedy this vulnerability for all
affected customers.

Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular
update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be
obtained via the Software Center on Cisco's Worldwide Web site at
http://www.cisco.com/.

Customers without contracts should get their upgrades by contacting the Cisco
Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows:

* +1 800 553 2447 (toll-free from within North America)
* +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
* E-mail: tac@cisco.com

Additional contact information for the Cisco TAC for non-English speakers is
available at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/687/Directory/DirTAC.shtml.

Give the URL of this notice as evidence of your entitlement to a free
upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through
the TAC. Please do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for
software upgrades.


Workarounds
===========

There are no workarounds for this defect. Customers are urged to upgrade to
the versions of code containing the fix for CSCdr11711.


Exploitation and Public Announcements
=====================================

Cisco has received no reports of malicious exploitation of this
vulnerability. The vulnerability was reported to Cisco by a customer and has
been discussed on BUGTRAQ, a public full-disclosure security mailing list.


Status of This Notice: FINAL
============================

This is a final notice. Although Cisco cannot guarantee the accuracy of all
statements in this notice, all of the facts have been checked to the best of
our ability. Cisco does not anticipate issuing updated versions of this notice
unless there is some material change in the facts. Should there be a
significant change in the facts, Cisco may update this notice.


Distribution
============

This notice is posted at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/pixtcpreset-pub.shtml on Cisco's
Worldwide Web site. A text version of this notice will be clear-signed with
the latest Cisco PSIRT RSA PGP key and posted to the following e-mail
recipients and Usenet newsgroups:

* cust-security-announce@cisco.com
* bugtraq@securityfocus.com
* firewalls@lists.gnac.net
* first-teams@first.org (includes CERT/CC)
* cisco@spot.colorado.edu
* cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net
* comp.dcom.sys.cisco
* Various internal Cisco mailing lists

Future updates of this notice, if any, will be placed on Cisco's Worldwide Web
server, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or
newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the URL
given above for any updates.


Revision History
================

+-------------+-----------+-----------------------+
|Revision 1.0 |2000-07-11 |Initial public release |
+-------------+-----------+-----------------------+


Cisco Product Security Incident Assistance Process
==================================================

The web page at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/sec_incident_response.shtml describes how
to report security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtain assistance with
security incidents, and register to receive product security information from
Cisco Systems, Inc., including instructions for press inquiries regarding
Cisco Security Advisories and notices. This advisory is Cisco's official
public statement regarding this vulnerability.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

This notice is Copyright 2000 by Cisco Systems, Inc. This notice may be
redistributed freely after the release date given at the top of the text,
provided that redistributed copies are complete and unmodified, including
all date and version information.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Copyright © [Telecom and Logistics Associates Sàrl]. All rights reserved.
Revised: juillet 11, 2000 .

All information provided is of a general nature and is not intended to address the circumstances of any particular individual or entity. Although we endeavor to provide accurate and timely information, there can be no guarantee that such information is accurate as of the date it is received or that it will continue to be accurate in the future. No one should act upon such information without appropriate professional advice after a thorough examination of the facts of the particular situation.